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Abstract 
We study the implications for pricing strategies and product offerings of consumers’ 
temptation when the differentiation of the product is horizontal. With horizontal differentiation, 
the temptation state is represented by a change in the consumers’ ideal product on the 
Hotelling line, so that consumers have two (possibly distinct) ideal products: one when 
committed and another when tempted. The firm faces the following trade-off: for the 
consumer who diverge the most between the ideal product with temptation and commitment, 
if the firm positions a product close to the consumer’s temptation ideal product, it increases 
the consumer’s surplus when tempted but decreases surplus with commitment, which lowers 
the consumer’s incentive to participate. This paper shows that, because of this trade-off, the 
firm may exclude products that are too close to the temptation preferences in the optimal 
menu. Moreover, it is shown that product diversity and firm’s profits decrease with the 
probability of temptation and with the consumers’ awareness of their dynamic inconsistency. 
(JEL: D11, D42, D82, L11, L12, L15) 
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1 Introduction
Consumers temptation is an important characteristic of the consumer purchasing
behavior. Many consumers establish ex-ante that they would like to commit to con-
suming healthy, low calorie groceries. Nonetheless, ex-post temptation takes place
and they modify their choices towards unhealthier alternatives. This behavior reects
the dynamic inconsistency of consumerspreferences commonly known as temptation.
An important implication is that when consumers are aware of their future change
in preferences, they are more willing to enter stores which do not carry unhealthy
products in order to avoid ex-post choices inconsistent with ex-ante preferences.
To capture this idea, Strotz (1955) and Kreps (1979) introduced a class of pref-
erences known as the "temptation representation". Let M denote the consumers
choice set and U the utility function the commitment utility function that he has
when making the shopping list. The consumer anticipates that, once inside the store,
his utility function will change to V with a positive probability . Let xu denote the
consumers choice with U his commitment choiceand xv denote his choice with V
his tempting choice. Then, the consumers expected ex-ante utility is given by
W (M) = (1  )U (xu) + U (xv) :
In this setting a dynamic consistency problem arises because, while the consumer
would like to commit ex-ante to choosing xu, with probability , he ends up choosing
xv. We can interpret this preference representation as though the consumer had,
ex-post, two di¤erent possible selves: a tempted and a committed self.2
Although simplied, this representation is convenient for our purposes as it creates
an ex-ante demand for menus that implement commitment.3 Eliaz and Spiegler (2006)
considers a similar consumer representation.
2Note that this representation is quite extreme: if an agent falls into temptation he will forget
about the commitment preferences and choose according to the temptation preferences only.
3Some papers have studied other temptation representation. Gul and Pessendorfer (2001), for
instance, consider that consumers utility from a choice set equals the realized commitment utility
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A novel contribution of this paper is that we analyze a monopolists optimal
pricing problem when the product is horizontally di¤erentiated. This allows us to
capture temptation as a change in the consumers ideal product on the Hotelling line.
We consider a continuum of consumer types; each consumer type knows that he has
two (possibly distinct) ideal products on a Hotelling line, one when committed and
another one when tempted. In the basic model, we assume that all consumer types
have the same temptation ideal product, located at one extreme of the Hotelling
line, but they di¤er when committed. Continuing from our previous example, this
assumption means that while consumers prefer products with di¤erent calories when
committed, they are only tempted by high calories product. Later in the paper, as
an extension, we study a generalization of the temptation representation.
In our model, a monopolist sells several products that can di¤er in their location
on the Hotelling line and in pricing. Therefore, the rms problem is to decide which
goods to o¤er on the Hotelling line and charge a price for each one in such a way
that expected prots are maximized. Since consumers are aware of the dynamic
inconsistency of their preferences, when designing the optimal selling strategy the
rm has to worry about both their incentives to enter the store (ex-ante IR), and
their incentives to participate once inside (ex-post IR). Moreover, the rmmust ensure
that once inside the store, each consumer chooses the product designed for himself
minus the linear "self-control costs", i.e., the realized temptation utility minus the maximum value
of the temptation utility over the choice set. Fudenberg and Levine (2005) allow for non-linear self-
control costs, as they argue that, with this model we can consider self-control as a limited resource
such that the "cognitive load" leads to agents falling into temptation more easily. Dekel, Lipman
and Rustichinis (2005) representation covers situations in which agents face uncertainty about the
"strength of temptation". Finally, under the Chatterjee and Krishna (2006) representation, the
agent has two di¤erent selves and temptation is thought of as the choice of a "virtual alternate
self" or alter ego, who appears with a positive probability which depends on the choice set. If the
temptation probability is not menu-dependent this representation coincides with the one that we
use in our model.
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(ex-post IC ).4
Using this model, we can understand the relationship between the consumers
temptation and the rms optimal product design. Does temptation increase or de-
crease product diversity? Do prices increase with temptation? Does it have welfare
implications?
In the standard horizontal di¤erentiation model without temptation, the monop-
olist o¤ers the ideal product of each consumer type. In our model, instead, the rm
faces the following trade-o¤: by positioning products closer to the temptation prefer-
ences, it can increase its prots under the temptation state. However, it also decreases
the consumersex-ante utility, especially for those with a greater distance between
their ideal products with commitment and temptation. Therefore, the rms optimal
menu may exclude products that are too close to the temptation preferences since
otherwise these consumers will not derive su¢ cient utility from entering the store.
In equilibrium, two types of consumers coexist: consumers with similar preferences
in the two states, who always consume the same product, and consumers with most
diverging preferences, who consume di¤erent products in di¤erent states. The size of
the two consumer groups, which is given by the degree of product diversity, and the
rms prots decrease with the probability of temptation.
In recent years, several authors have explored the implications of consumer temp-
tation on pricing. A paper related to our work is Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum
(2006). Using Gul and Pessendorfers (2001) preferences and a vertical di¤erentia-
tion environment, they construct a model in which a monopolist chooses the price
and quality of the goods it o¤ers the consumer once inside one store. Thus, as in
the present paper, they restrict the number of menus to one. As in our model, they
nd that the rm is not better o¤ when the consumer operates under temptation
4Eliaz and Spiegler (2004) use a model in which consumers and the rm have to sign a contract
before entering the store, thus they work with an ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint. In our
model we do not consider the possibility of the ex-ante contract, so consumers must decide, ex-post,
which product to choose from among all the available o¤ers in the stores menu.
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and that the heterogeneity of the product o¤ered may be bounded as a result. In
other related papers, such as Esteban and Miyagawa (2006a), the rm can o¤er mul-
tiple menus which allow the rm to earn more prots, while Esteban and Miyagawa
(2006b) consider a competitive framework in which each rm can also choose sev-
eral menus. Also using a vertical di¤erentiation setting, Eliaz and Spiegler (2006)
study a model in which dynamically inconsistent agents sign a contract with a rm,
using the same temptation representation used here. In contrast with our model,
they assume that while the rm correctly anticipates the consumersinconsistency,
consumers incorrectly believe that, with some probability, they are going to take ac-
tions in accordance with their "commitment" preferences. This "non-common priors"
assumption is the source of the exploitative contracts that arise in equilibrium. In
contrast, our model assumes that consumers are perfectly aware of their dynamic
inconsistency, i.e., they are "sophisticated" consumers. However, in Section 5, we
extend our model to consider "naive" consumers, as in the Eliaz and Spiegler model.
We show that when consumers are su¢ ciently naive, the monopolist can extract all
the consumerssurplus. The monopolist o¤ers a menu which would not be accepted
by consumers if they had the same priors as the rm. They enter the store attracted
by the benets of an "imaginary o¤er" that they (incorrectly) believe to be purchasing
when committed.
There are other papers that study mechanism design for consumers with time
inconsistent preferences, however they focus on present-biased preferences with hy-
perbolic discounting. For instance, ODonoghue and Rabin (1999b) study the optimal
contract that the rm must o¤er to a worker who is naive, i.e., he is unaware of his
dynamic inconsistency. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) study a model with two
kinds of goods: investment goods with immediate costs and delayed benets, and
leisure goods with immediate benets but delayed costs. In equilibrium, rms price
investment goods below marginal costs and leisure goods above marginal costs. If
consumers are fully aware of their dynamic inconsistency, the agents achieve a so-
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cially e¢ cient solution, but if agents are naive then the equilibrium is ine¢ cient.
Saradis (2005) constructs a model in which consumers form expectations not only
about their future behavior but also about the rms prices. The main result is that
the more naive consumers are, the lower the monopolist prots will be.
Finally, in contrast to our model some papers considers that the temptation prob-
ability is an endogenous variable. For instance, there are papers that study addition
and consumers with environmental cues. Laibson (2001), use a version of the Becker
and Murphy (1988) model of addition, including environmental cues that arise during
each period with some probability. Due to a cue, the more the agents consume today,
the greater the marginal utility tomorrow. Therefore, consumption is determined by
the stock of past consumption in each state of the world. Their results show that the
probability of falling into consumption due to a cue (temptation) decreases with the
consumersdiscount factor, the value of the outside option, and the impact of current
consumption on the stock of consumption. Our model is not about environmental
cues since in the consumersrepresentation used here, the temptation probability is
an exogenous variable.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In Section 3,
we study two important benchmarks: the time consistent preferences case, i.e., the
standard model in which the temptation probability is zero, and the time inconsistent
preferences case in which, ex-post, the only possible state is the temptation state.
Section 4 characterizes the monopolists optimal menu. Section 5 extends the model to
cover the case of non-common priors and more general specications of the consumers
preferences. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
A monopolist can produce and sell several products in one store. Products are hori-
zontally di¤erentiated à la Hotelling on a segment of unit length. An o¤er from the
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seller is denoted by x and is a pair (q; p), where q 2 [0; 1] represents the products
location and p 2 R+ its price. A menu M is a compact subset of o¤ers M  R2:
Let M = M [ (; 0) denote the set of o¤ers available to the consumer, where (; 0)
is the outside option which has a price of zero. We assume consumers are perfectly
informed about the o¤ers in the menu.
There is a set of consumers, each of them buying at most one product and deciding,
ex-ante, whether to enter the monopolists store. They can also choose to stay outside
the store, which we formalize as choosing the outside option NE = (; 0).
To model consumersbehavior we use the "dual-selves" approach based on Strotz
(1995) and Kreps (1979). In particular, we consider that, before entering the store, a
consumer evaluates his ex-post decisions with his commitment utility function U ().
However, with a probability , a consumer makes ex-post decisions with his tempta-
tion utility function V ().
We assume that  is the consumers commitment ideal product on the Hotelling
line which is distributed according to a uniform distribution with support [0; 1] : We
also assume that v = 0 is the consumersideal product when tempted.5 Therefore,
we consider that, when tempted, all consumers have "extreme" preferences.6 Then,
given a typical menu M , the (ex-ante) surplus of a consumer type  if he enters the
store is:
W
 
M ; 

= (1  ) max
x2M
U (x; ) + U (xv; ) ;
where
xv = arg max
x2M
V (x) :
A consumer type  enters the store only if his ex-ante utility is positive. We call
this condition ex-ante IR. The interpretation is that, once a consumer is inside the
store, he will choose with probability (1   ) the best element in the menu with
his commitment utility, while with probability  he will choose with his temptation
5In Section 5 we study more general specications of the temptation preferences.
6Note that v = 1 has a similar interpretation.
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utility. From now on we will refer to the former as the commitment state and to the
latter as the temptation state.
Given a menu M , we dene the assignment function x () = (q () ; p ()) : [0; 1]!
M that species for each type  2 [0; 1] the o¤er that he is expected to choose.
Denition 1 An o¤er x () = (q () ; p ()) is the commitment choice for
consumer  if x () = arg max
x2M
U(x; ).
Denition 2 An o¤er x (v) = xv = (qv; pv) is the tempting choice for the
consumer if x v = arg max
x2M
V (x):
Therefore, the tempting (resp., commitment) choice is the o¤er that a consumer
is expected to choose in the temptation (resp., commitment) state. Note that since
consumers have the same ideal product when tempted, their choices under this state
must be the same. On the other hand, under commitment, consumers have di¤erent
preferences so their choices may di¤er.
We consider the following specication for the commitment and temptation utility
functions, respectively:
U(x; ) = s  p  t(q; ); (1)
V (x) = s  p  t(q; v); (2)
and normalize
U ((; 0); ) = V ((; 0)) = W (NE; ) = 0: (3)
This is the typical utility specication of a horizontal di¤erentiation model, where
s 2 R+ represents the maximum possible surplus enjoyed by consumers, and t (q; )
represents the transportation cost, which satises:
(i) Symmetry: t(q; ) = t(; q);
(ii) Non negativity: t(q; )  0;
(iii) Identity of indiscernibles: t(q; ) = 0 i¤ q = ;
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(iv) Increasing in Euclidean distance: t(q1; 1)  t (q2; 2) i¤ j1   q1j  j2   q2j;
and,
(v) Strict Superadditivity: t (q; ) > t (q; z) + t (z; ) for all z 2 (q; ) :
Property (i)   (iv) are standard properties used in any horizontal di¤erentia-
tion model. An important implication of (v), which we use in our analysis, is that
jt1 (q; )j > jt1 (q; z)j for all z 2 (q; ). Hence, the marginal transportation cost in-
creases in the distance between  and q.7 An example of a transportation cost function
which satises all properties (i)(v) is the quadratic function: t (q; ) = (q   )2 :
For simplicity, we assume the market is fully covered, which, as standard, requires
s being su¢ ciently large.
The monopolists problem
The monopolists problem is to design a menu M = fx () ; xvg2[0;1] which max-
imizes his prots subject to consumers participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of production is equal
to zero. Therefore, the monopolists problem is given by
max
fx();xvg2[0;1]
(1  )
Z
p () d + pv
s.t., for all  2 [0; 1] ;
W (M ; ) = (1  )U (x () ; ) + U (xv; )  0; (Ex-ante IR)
U (x () ; )  0; (Ex-post U -IR)
V (xv)  0; (Ex-post V -IR )
U (x () ; )  U (y; ) for all y 2M; (Ex-post U -IC)
V (xv)  V (y) for all y 2M: (Ex-post V -IC)
7Note that this works as a single crossing condition for all consumer types with  > q.
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Consumer type  will enter the store if W (M ; )  0. So, when the ex-ante
IR constraint is satised, consumers choose from M .8 The ex-post IR and IC are
standard constraints. As usual, ex-post IR says that a consumer is at least as well o¤
purchasing from the menu as choosing the outside option. Finally, ex-post IC says
that a consumer of type  cannot be better o¤ by pretending to be another type in
each state of the world.
The ex-post IR and IC constraints together imply that x () (resp., xv) is an
optimal choice for U(; ) (resp., V ()).
In the following lemma we show that if the ex-ante IR and ex-post U   IC
constraints are satised, consumers obtain a non-negative ex-post surplus.
Lemma 1 Ex-ante IR and ex-post U   IC imply ex-post U   IR.
Proof. Ex-post U   IC tells us
U (x () ; )  U (y; ) for all y 2M: (4)
Since the market is covered, x () 2 M and thus equation (4) implies that for all
 2 [0; 1]
U (x () ; )  (1  )U (x () ; ) + U (xv; ) = W (M ; )  0; (5)
where the second inequality follows from ex-ante IR.
By Lemma 1 we know that, since the market is covered, when the monopolist
designs the optimal menu he only needs to worry about ex-ante IR, ex-post U   IC
and ex-post V   IR:
8Thus, it is assumed that if a consumer  is indi¤erent to choosing from M or NE, i.e., if
W
 
M ; 

= 0, he ends up choosing from M:
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3 Benchmark Cases
In this section we study two benchmark specications that are particular cases of
our model. First, we study the case in which the temptation probability equals zero.
That is, consumerschoices are always consistent. Second, we study the case in which
the temptation probability equals one. That is, all consumers anticipate that they
will always be tempted inside the store.
3.1 Time Consistent Preferences ( = 0)
Our utility representation allows for consumers to be evaluating both their ex-ante
and their ex-post decisions with their commitment utility. This is the case when the
temptation probability equals zero, so that our model becomes a standard horizontal
di¤erentiation model. In this standard model, by selling the set of consumersideal
products, the rm can extract the entire surplus of each consumer type. Thus, in
equilibrium, the monopolist will o¤er the menuMFC = f; sg for all  2 [0; 1] : This is
obviously a feasible menu: All IR constraints are binding while all the IC constraints
are slack.
However, as the temptation probability increases, the monopolist faces the follow-
ing trade-o¤s. Since the market is covered, product qv, which is to be consumed when
consumers are tempted, must be desirable ex-post, satisfying ex-post V   IR, but
must be such that consumers also want to enter the store with their ex-ante utility
function. If product qv is located closer to v, then it is the furthest away from the
commitment ideal products of some of the remaining consumers, and thus prices must
be lower for the ex-ante IR of these consumer types to be satised. This e¤ect gives
the monopolist fewer incentives to position qv at v. But then, consumer types closer
to v will consume the tempting product under commitment as well, which implies
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that the monopolist narrows the variety of products he o¤ers when the temptation
probability () increases.
3.2 Time Inconsistent Preferences ( = 1)
Assume now that the probability of temptation is such that consumers, once inside
the store, will purchase the tempting choice. Therefore, the monopolist only sells qv
and his maximization problem becomes
max
fqv ;pvg
pv
s.t., for all  2 [0; 1] ;
U (xv; )  0; (Ex-ante IR)
V (xv)  0: (Ex-post V   IR)
Since the market is covered, the ex-ante IR constraint must be satised for all
 2 [0; 1] : As dU(xv ;)
d
 0 ( 0) for all   qv (  qv) ; the binding constraints
are the ex-ante IR constraint for  = 1 and the ex-post V   IR constraint. It
is then immediate to see that the monopolist maximizes prots by positioning qv
equidistantly between v = 0 and  = 1: Thus, qv = 1
2
; and pv is set to extract the
consumersentire ex-post surplus. In equilibrium, the monopolist o¤ers the menu
MFT =

1
2
; s  t  1
2
; v
	
:
In sum, if  = 0, the monopolist o¤ers the consumersideal products, whereas if
 = 1, the monopolist o¤ers a single product.
4 Characterization of the Optimal Menu
In this section we compute the optimal menu of o¤ers for any . We start by deriving
some auxiliary results.
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Note that ex-post incentive compatibility and superadditivity of t (q; ) imply
q(b)  q () for all b  . Moreover, since v = 0, it follows trivially that if x () = xv
for some consumer type  2 [0; 1], then x(b) = xv for all b  . Therefore, consumers
purchasing the same product in both states (i.e., x () = xv) are located closer to
the temptation preferences, v, than consumers who purchase di¤erent products in
di¤erent states (i.e., x () 6= xv). Let us denote by k the lowest consumer type who
buy the same product in both states. In the following lemma we prove that the rm
optimally o¤ers the ideal commitment product for all consumer types with   k.
Lemma 2 At the optimal menu q () =  for all  2 [k; 1] : Moreover, p () = p 
pv, for all  2 [k; 1] :
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that by o¤ering the ideal commitment product
for all consumer types  2 [k; 1], their ex-ante surplus is increased. This allows the
monopolist to raise the prices of the products it o¤ers.
In equilibrium we have that x () = xv for all  < k while x () 6= xv for all
  k: For consumer k, U (x (k) ; k) = U (xv; k).
Moreover, by Lemma 2, we obtain the following monotonicity result:
for all   qv (  qv) ; dW
d
 0

dW
d
 0

:
The next lemma shows that the tempting choice coincides with the commitment
choice of consumer k.
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, xv = (k; p) :
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is obvious that, if V (xv) > 0 (resp.,W
 
M ; 1

> 0),
it is protable for the monopolist to increase qv (resp., decrease qv) and increase p.
Therefore, in equilibrium, V (xv) = W
 
M ; 1

= 0 must hold. Then,
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s  p   t (qv; 0) = (1  ) (s  p) +  (s  p   t (qv; 1)) = 0;
and
t (qv; 0) = t (qv; 1) : (6)
Based on the auxiliary results above, the next proposition fully characterize the
optimal menu.
Proposition 1 At the optimal menu, the products o¤ered are x = (; p), for all
 2 [k; 1] :
Furthermore, the tempting choice (qv; pv) = (k; p) satises
t (qv; 0) = t (qv; 1) ;
and
pv = p = s  t (qv; 0) :
Note that these results give us noteworthy features of the optimal menu. Firstly, qv
is an increasing function of  with qv ( = 0) = 0 and qv ( = 1) = 1
2
, which coincides
with the full commitment and the full temptation benchmarks, respectively. Secondly,
since by Lemma 2, qv = k, as temptation probability increases fewer consumers make
di¤erent choices under di¤erent states, so product diversity decreases.
Fig. 1. Optimal Menu
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Moreover, since all products sold in the store are sold at the price p and the
market is covered, the rms prots are
 = p = s  t (qv; 0) :
Thus, product prices and monopolists prots decrease with . The intuition
is that since consumers are aware of their time inconsistency, a higher temptation
probability has to be compensated with lower prices to attract consumers into the
store, which leads to lower prots for the monopolist.
Finally, the consumersex-ante surplus is
W
 
M ; 

=
8<: t (qv; 0)  t (qv; ) 8 2 [0; k][t (qv; 1)  t (qv; )] 8 2 [k; 1]
By Lemma 2, we know that qv = k; thus k is the only consumer type who
consumes his ideal product under both states, so it is not surprising that he gets the
maximum consumer surplus of all the consumer types.
Fig. 2. Ex-ante consumerssurplus
Moreover, we know that a higher temptation probability implies lower product
prices to attract consumer  = 1 into the store (i.e., W
 
M ; 1

= 0 needs to hold)
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which implies that for all  2 (0; 1) ; W  M ;  increases with the temptation proba-
bility.
5 Extensions
In this section we analyze two important extensions of our previous model. First, we
extend our setting to allow for non common priors. Second, we relax the assumption
that v is located at one extreme of the Hotelling line.
5.1 The Non-Common Priors Case
It is reasonable to think that in several situations, the rm has better knowledge
about consumerschange in tastes than consumers themselves. Like Eliaz and Spiegler
(2006) (ES from here on), we formalize this non-common priors idea assuming that
the rm knows that temptation occurs with probability one, while consumers believe
that their preferences will not change with a positive probability (1  ) (i.e., they are
naive). Therefore, the monopolist now only cares about the prots from the tempting
choice xv = (qv; pv) and uses the commitment choices to induce consumers to enter
the store (i.e., as a hook).
Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest pv; in this setting we still have
V (xv) = 0 in equilibrium, thus from the V   IC, it follows that
0 = V (xv)  V (x) = s  p  t (q; v) :
Moreover, the monopolist wants to charge the lowest possible p to induce con-
sumers to enter the store, which is p = s  t (q; v) :
In the next lemma we show that the monopolist o¤ers just one product to be
consumed under commitment.
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Lemma 4 At the optimal menu there is a single commitment choice for consumers
given by x = (1; s  t (1; 0)) : Consequently, k = 0.
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is that the rm wants to locate the commitment
o¤er as far from the tempting choice as possible in order to charge the highest possible
price under the temptation state. This implies that in equilibrium the commitment
choice is so attractive for committed consumers that all consumers  2 (0; 1] expect
to choose x under commitment.
Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest possible pv, we want to check
whether charging pv = s (i.e., locating qv = v = 0) is feasible. The next lemma
addresses this issue and summarizes the equilibrium tempting choice.
Lemma 5 At the optimal menu,
(i) xv = (qv; pv) = (0; s) for all   1
2
; and,
(ii) qv is given by the equation, t (qv; 1)  t (qv; 0) = 1 

t (1; 0) for all  > 1
2
.
When consumers believe that temptation occurs with a low probability
 
  1
2

,
the rm can extract the consumersentire surplus, positioning qv = 0. Note that, by
the properties of the transportation cost function, the solution qv () is continuous
and dq
v()
d
> 0 for all  > 1
2
. Moreover, when  = 1, we obtain the full temptation
benchmark with common priors. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium choices under both
types of priors.
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium with Common Priors (CP) and Non-Common Priors (NCP).
Therefore our results are similar in spirit to that of ES. Note that x is an "imag-
inary o¤er" (or a hook): consumers believe that they will purchase it with a positive
probability, whereas the rm knows that all consumers will end up purchasing xv
once in the store. The monopolist uses the imaginary o¤er to attract consumers into
the store and it wants to charge the lowest possible p. However, this price has a lower
bound (p = s  t (1; 0)) due to the incentive compatibility constraints. When con-
sumers believe that temptation occurs with a low probability
 
 < 1
2

the monopolist
can extract all of the consumerssurplus when they are tempted, and consumers nd
it optimal to enter the store due to the benets that they (incorrectly) expect to re-
ceive when committed. However, when  is su¢ ciently large, the expected gains that
consumer  = 1 expects to obtain under commitment are lower than the expected
losses that he expects to su¤er when tempted if the tempting choice is xv = (0; s).
Because of this, the monopolist has to design qv su¢ ciently close to  = 1; otherwise,
this consumer type will not derive a su¢ ciently high ex-ante utility to entice him to
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enter into store.9
In our non-common priors case, the monopolist is o¤ering a menu which would not
be accepted by some consumer types if they had the same priors as him. Therefore, it
is obvious that the monopolist obtains higher prots in the non-common priors case
than in the common priors case. Moreover as with common priors, the price of the
tempting choice, and hence the monopolists prots, decrease with the temptation
probability.
Let us now discuss the di¤erences between our analysis and that of ES. As in the
present paper, ES study a model in which a monopolist has to design a menu for
dynamically inconsistent consumers. However, whereas here we consider a horizontal
di¤erentiation model in which consumers di¤er in their commitment preferences, ES
study a vertical di¤erentiation model in which consumers di¤er only in their prior
beliefs about the future state. In ES equilibrium, sophisticated types (i.e., those with
a high prior) choose a contract which perfectly commits them to their commitment
choice, while naive types (i.e., those with a low prior) choose an exploitative contract,
which is a contract that gives them a negative utility under temptation state in
accordance with their commitment preferences (i.e., U (xv) < 0). Our results conrm
that with a low  there is exploitation in equilibrium (i.e., U (xv) < 0 for all  > 0).
However, with our temptation model we can provide more results. If  is high, the
exploited consumers are those for which the di¤erence between their ideal product
when committed, , and the temptation ideal product, v, is large. Moreover, the set
of exploited consumers decreases as  increases, because the rm has to design the
tempting choice closer to their commitment preferences.
9As in the common priors case we are assuming that s is su¢ ciently large to cover the market.
However in this case there is an important di¤erence: when  < 12 , the rm wants to cover the
market for any s, the reason is that in this case the rm can attract even consumer  = 1 by o¤ering
xv = (0; s).
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5.2 Generalization of Temptation Preferences
In this section, we relax the assumption that consumerstemptation ideal product is
a single point located at the extreme of the line. Firstly, we consider the case where
the consumerstemptation ideal product is located in the interior of the interval [0; 1].
Secondly, we study the case where, ex-ante, the agents face uncertainty about the
ex-post temptation ideal product.
General temptation ideal product 0  v  1
We next show that our previous results with v located at one extreme of the
Hotelling line can be easily extended to the case where 0  v  1: To understand this,
we next consider the case where v = 1
2
. Note that we can interpret this case as if faced
with two di¤erent standard cases where v is located at one extreme, one with  2
0; 1
2

and v = 1
2
and another one with  2 1
2
; 1

and v = 1
2
. Let qv (resp., qv) be the
tempting choice of the former (resp., the later) case. Applying our previous results,
we know that the tempting choice in each case is the one located closest to v and the
commitment choice satises q () =  for all  <qv and  > qv. Therefore, in this case
we have two tempting choices satisfying V (xv) = V (xv) = 0: Although consumers
get the same utility from consuming both tempting choices, we assume that consumer
types  2 0; 1
2

consume xv while consumer types  2 1
2
; 1

consume xv: Since qv
satises, W
 
M; 0

= V (xv) = 0 in equilibrium, t
 
qv; 1
2

= t
 
qv; 0

. Similarly, since
qv satises W
 
M; 1

= V (xv) = 0 in equilibrium, t
 
qv; 1
2

= t (qv; 1) : Graphically
Fig. 4. Optimal Menu when v = 1
2
.
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Since the tempting choices locations are farther away from v as the temptation
probability increases, if v 6= 1
2
it is possible that for a su¢ ciently large , we get
a corner solution in qv = 0 or qv = 1; which implies that t
 
qv; v
  t (qv; v) or
t
 
qv; v
  t (qv; v) respectively. In the following lemma we summarize this idea
Lemma 6 Let 0  v  1, in equilibrium
(i) if v < 1
2
t (qv; v) = t (qv; 1) = t
 
qv; v

for all qv > 0;
t (qv; v) = t (qv; 1) > t
 
qv; v

for all qv = 0;
(ii) if v > 1
2
t
 
qv; v

= t
 
qv; 0

= t (qv; v) for all qv < 1;
t
 
qv; v

= t
 
qv; 0

> t (qv; v) for all qv = 1:
If v < 1
2
, consumer  = 1 has the lowest incentives to enter the store since
his commitment ideal product is the farthest away from his temptation ideal prod-
uct, thus in equilibrium we have W
 
M; 1

= 0 to ensure consumersparticipation:
Moreover, we know that the tempting choices have to satisfy V (xv) = V (xv) = 0.
Therefore, if qv > 0; in equilibrium we have two tempting choices located equidistant
from v; but, if  is so high that it makes qv = 0; we have that t
 
qv; v
  t (qv; v) :
Therefore, since the monopolist has to make both tempting choices equally desirable
for consumers when tempted, he has to charge a lower price for qv. In particular we
have that p = s  t (qv; v)  s  t (0; v) =p. Since v > 1
2
is the symmetric case, the
intuition would be the same.
Uncertainty about the consumerstemptation ideal product, v 2
h
0; 
v
i
A natural generalization of our model is to consider the case where v is not a
single point but rather it takes di¤erent values. In particular we consider that v is
20
uniformly distributed in the interval
h
0; 
v
i
, where 
v 2 (0; 1]. The interpretation is
that both, consumers and the monopolist, are unsure about the future temptation
ideal product. Let q be the product located closest to 0 on the Hotelling line. The
following lemma summarizes the equilibrium.
Lemma 7 Let v be uniformly distributed in
h
0; 
v
i
, the optimal menu isM = f; pg
for all  2 q; 1 ; where q satises
(1  ) t  q; 0+ 

v
 
qt
 
q; 0

+
Z v
q
t (q; 0) dq
!
=


v
"
qt
 
q; 1

+
Z v
q
t (q; 1) dq
#
for all q < 
v
;
t
 
q; 0

= t
 
q; 1

for all q > 
v
:
and
p =
8<: s  p   (1  ) t
 
q; 0
  

v

qt
 
q; 0

+
R v
q
t (q; 0) dq

for all q < 
v
;
s  t  q; 0 for all q > v:
Note that if q > 
v
the result is the same as in the original model, because tempted
consumers always choose q (i.e., qv =q). Thus, from equation (6), t
 
q; 0

= t
 
q; 1

.
However, if q< 
v
, every product in the interval
h
q; 
v
i
could be chosen under
temptation (i.e., qv 2
h
q; 
v
i
). Therefore, the consumersex-ante surplus is
W
 
M ; 

=
8<: s  p  (1  ) t
 
q; 
  

v

qt
 
q; 

+
R v
q
t (q; ) dq

for all  < q
s  p  

v

qt
 
q; 

+
R v
q
t (q; ) dq

for all  > q
Note that, knowingW
 
M ; 

, we only need to requireW
 
M ; 0

= W
 
M ; 1

= 0
to obtain Lemma 7:
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium location q.
As in the standard case, q is an increasing function of : However, note that
qv = q


v
= 0

 q


v
> 0

: The idea behind this is that, when q < 
v
, we do not
just have one possible tempting choice but a continuum of possible tempting choices
in the interval
h
q; 
v
i
. Therefore, there are possible tempting choices located closer
to  = 1, which gives the consumer a greater ex-ante surplus. This implies that the
monopolist can design q closer to 0, which leads to higher product prices. Moreover,
the greater 
v
is the farther the location of the possible tempting choices will be. The
monopolist can farther increase the product prices by lowering q:
6 Conclusion
We have considered a model in which consumers face problems of temptation and self-
control, where temptation is modelled as a change of the consumersideal product in
the Hotelling segment. We have studied the optimal menu designed by a monopolist.
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In our basic model, consumers are perfectly aware of their dynamic inconsistency
and all consumers have the same temptation preferences. In this case, the optimal
menu is di¤erent from the one in a standard horizontal di¤erentiation model in the
following sense. In equilibrium, the monopolist truncates the set of products o¤ered,
not o¤ering the products closest to the consumerstemptation ideal product. As a
result the number of products o¤ered decreases with the temptation probability. As
an extension, we have studied the case in which consumers are only partially aware
of their dynamic inconsistency. In particular, following Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), we
have studied the case in which the monopolist knows that consumers will be tempted
but consumers, instead, believe incorrectly that they will be tempted with probability
. We have shown that, if  is su¢ ciently low, the monopolist o¤ers as many products
as consumer types there are, but if  is su¢ ciently high, the rm does not o¤er the
products closest to the consumersideal products. Finally, we have studied a more
general specication of the temptation preferences and have shown that our main
results remain true.
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APPENDIX
Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 2
We show that a gap with no products in
 
; 
  [k; 1] ; can be improved upon by
designing a product with bq 2  ;  : Let p be the price of the product  and p be the
price of product . Assume with no loss of generality that consumer b 2  ;  buys
product . Then product bx = b; bp where bp = maxnp+ tb;  ; p+ tb; o ;
is feasible and yields more prots. Thus, repeating this argument, we get that, in
equilibrium, q () =  for all  2  ;  :
Since q () =  for all   k by U   IC constraints we have that p () = p for
all   k:
Finally, by V   IC constraint, p   pv  t (qv; v)  t (k; v)  0; where the last
inequality follows from the fact that qv  k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
We show that, if qv < k; the monopolist nds it optimal to decrease k: By
denition of k, U (x (k) ; k) = U (xv; k) : Thus, using Lemma 2, pv = p  t (qv; k).
Therefore, the monopolists prots are
 = (1  ) (k (p   t (qv; k)) + (1  k) p)+ (p   t (qv; k)) = p t (qv; k) ( + (1  ) k) ;
where d
dk
< 0 for all qv < k: Thus, in equilibrium, qv = k, which implies pv = p
by incentive compatibility. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Immediate from Lemmas 1-3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
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Suppose by contradiction that the monopolist designs commitment products in
the interval [; 1], where  2 [0; 1) : Then, for any commitment product, the price is
p = s  t (; 0) ; which is unique by the incentive compatibility constraints: Therefore,
the ex-ante surplus of consumers with   k, is given by
W
 
M; 

=
8<: (1  )
 
s  p  t (; )+  (t (qv; v)  t (qv; )) for all  < ;
(1  )  s  p+  (t (qv; v)  t (qv; )) for all   :
Since
dW(M;)
d
< 0, for all  > qv; the "worst consumer type" from the point of view
of the monopolist is  = 1. Note that by setting  = 1 the monopolist maximizes
W
 
M; 1

and thus allows for the lowest qv which yields the highest price for the
tempting product and hence the highest prots.
Finally, note that since  = 1, p = s   t (1; 0), moreover since V (xv) = 0, pv =
s   t (qv; 0) : Therefore from the denition of k, U (x (k) ; k) = U (xv; k) we get
that k = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest possible pv; we need to check
that pv = s (i.e., locating qv = v = 0) is feasible. In our case, it is su¢ cient to check
that W
 
M; 
  0 for all  2 [0; 1]
W
 
M; 

= (1  ) (s  p  t (q; )) +  (s  pv   t (qv; )) :
Thus, applying Lemma 4 and letting pv = s
W
 
M; 

= (1  ) (s  (s  t (1; 0))  t (1; )) +  (t (0; 0)  t (0; ))
= (1  ) (t (1; 0)  t (1; ))  t (0; ) :
Note that
dW
 
M; 

d
= 0 if and only if
t0 (1; )t0 (0; )
 = 1  
Due to the properties of the transportation cost function, this implies that for all
 2 [0; 1] ; 9 2 [0; 1] such that for all  <  ( > ), dW(M;)
d
> 0 (< 0) : Therefore,
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since W (M; 0) = 0, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for W
 
M; 
  0 for all
 2 [0; 1] is that W  M; 1  0: Since
W
 
M; 1

= (1  ) t (1; 0)  t (0; 1) ;
= (1  ) t (1; 0)  t (1; 0) ;
then W
 
M; 1
  0 i¤   1
2
: This implies that, when  > 1
2
, the monopolist has to
locate the tempting choice beyond v, i.e., qv > 0; which implies charging a pv < s to
attract consumer  = 1 into the store. Since W
 
M; 1

= 0, then
W
 
M; 1

= (1  ) t (1; 0)   (t (qv; 0)  t (qv; 1)) = 0
Thus
t (qv; 1)  t (qv; 0) = 1  

t (1; 0)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6
It su¢ ces to show (i) since (ii) is symmetric. If qv > 0, the result is trivial.
If qv = 0; note that t (qv; v)  t (0; v). If we consider the interval [v; 1], we can
apply the results of the standard case. Thus, in equilibrium, W
 
M; 1

= V (xv) = 0:
Therefore, t (qv; v) = t (qv; 1) : Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7
Note that, in this case, the results of Section 4 (Lemma 2 and Lemma 3) are still
valid if we substitute qv for q: Thus, the optimal menu isM = (; p) for all  2 q; 1.
Moreover, as in Section 4, we have W
 
M; 0

= W
 
M; 1

= 0 in equilibrium: If
q > 
v
, there is just one tempting choice, i.e., qv = q. Therefore, using the previous
condition
s  p   t  q; 0 = (1  ) (s  p) +   s  p   t  q; 1 = 0;
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so that
t
 
q; 0

= t
 
q; 1

:
However, if q < 
v
, every product in
h
q; 
v
i
can be chosen under temptation de-
pending on the realization of v. For all v 2 0; q ; it follows that qv = q, whereas for
all v 2

q; 
v
i
, qv = v. Therefore, since W
 
M; 0

= W
 
M; 1

= 0 in equilibrium
s  p   (1  ) t  q; 0  

v
 
qt
 
q; 0

+
Z v
q
t (q; 0) dq
!
=
(1  ) (s  p) + 
 
s  p   1
v
"Z q
0
t
 
q; 1

dq +
Z v
q
t (q; 1) dq
#!
= 0:
Thus,
(1  ) t  q; 0+ 

v
 
qt
 
q; 0

+
Z v
q
t (q; 0) dq
!
=


v
"
qt
 
q; 1

+
Z v
q
t (q; 1) dq
#
:
Finally, since W
 
M; 0

= 0, then
p =
8<: s  p   (1  ) t
 
q; 0
  

v

qt
 
q; 0

+
R v
q
t (q; 0) dq

for all q < 
v
;
s  t  q; 0 for all q > v:
Q.E.D.
29
